My Supposition of an Evolutionary Horizon of Colorblind Altruism

Remember the concept of a ‘limit’ in Precalculus? I think there is a limit of human evolution–that altruistic personality traits will preside in deep evolutionary time. I see the (de facto) efforts of Antiracism to reward antisocial traits (identifying them by color), which would be maladaptive if it weren’t for the scaffolding provided by Antiracism, as doomed to fail; I see Antiracism as deviating from the efficient trajectory toward the evolutionary horizon.

Blind cooperation may decrease evolutionary fitness in many ways, but I believe it confers evolutionary advantage over large enough timescales. Cooperating/conforming/complying as a general rule beats out egoism in deep evolutionary time. It is a superior survival strategy.

Many white nationalists (by this I mean most Alt-Righters) are caught up in the toxic misconception that ethnocentrism is the superior evolutionary strategy, but it is not. Moreover, I would argue that to sacrifice altruism at the altar of ‘white survival’ is to sacrifice the heart and soul of the ‘white race’.

The meek will inherit the Earth. Those who blindly cooperate–who intuitively grasp the primacy of cooperation (a la the Prisoner’s Dilemma)–will inherit the Earth.

I recently wrote a followup to this, in which I cite a study which corroborates much of what I’m saying. It can be found here.

— — —


A blog entry I wrote on why y’all ought to jump on this idea of mine even if it were the case that I’m wrong.

Another entry touching a bit upon the logic of belief, and why appeals to ethnic self-interest and–God forbid–logic and reason are hardly persuasive.

A blog entry where I cite Szolnoki & Perc as evidence for my idea that we can, in a sense, extrapolate an evolutionary horizon with high frequencies of traits for unconditional and/or colorblind cooperation.

An Essay I slapped together (in like three hours; pardon sloppiness) about the Axelrod and Hammond simulation of the prisoner’s dilemma writ large:

The Social Contract: Does Multiculturalism Diminish Its Robustness?

Since the dawn of the global age, which can be thought of us the post-war era and the end of Western imperialism, human populations that were once partitioned by geography, language or religion, have been flung into common association. Through this process, the highest orders of the social contract—previously made possible due to homogeneity and insularity, and therefore the advantages incurred by ethnocentricity—have come to be strained by the dispersion of different ethnic groups with their own ethnic interests in the midst of native European populations where, due to genetic proximity, self-interest once overlapped heavily with collective interest. As such, in this era of multiculturalism, the likes of Axelrod and Hammond have come to conclusions that ethnocentrist limitations on cooperation, rather than colorblind altruism, will come to prevail in deep evolutionary time. Nevertheless, as I shall contend, such models are overly simplistic and fail to recognize that varying shades of contingent cooperation exist; that varying shades of likeness and similarity exist, that social structures might emerge to enforce altruism, that altruism may incur other fitness enhancers, and that sexual reproduction may mean that the genes of non-discriminating altruists may be passed on even if the males among them are routinely cuckolded. In short, the social contract in the era of multiculturalism need not be downgraded from maximal cooperation. Colorblind altruism is an unstoppable force of our evolutionary history.

In their 2006 study, “The Evolution of Ethnocentrism”, first appearing in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Ross Hammond and Robert Axelrod, professors of political science and public policy, respectively, devised a computer simulation which, after thousands of iterations, measured the procreative fitness of members of different groups based on their rigid adherence to one of four social survival strategies—in-group cooperation and out-group cooperation (altruism), in-group cooperation and out-group betrayal (ethnocentrism), in-group betrayal and out-group cooperation (defection), and in-group betrayal and out-group betrayal (egoism). The main takeaway from this study was that ethnocentrism was by-and-far the most successful strategy (Axelrod & Hammond 929), with altruism not far behind (930). While the study was far from rigorous, it was clear that the relative reproductive costs and gains of being aided or spurned by agents of other colors had little effect on the predominance of ethnocentrism. Nevertheless, there is still much room to contend that the social contract in a multicultural society need not be downgraded in light of these results.

The reasons why ethnocentrism is not as preeminent as Axelrod and Hammond’s simulation suggests is manifold. As has been shown in the past (Tajfel 18), there are innumerable vectors of discrimination, many of which transcend phenotypal or genetic differences, and are therefore wholly divorced from questions regarding in-group versus out-group cooperation or defection. As Axelrod and Hammond write, “group distinctions [may well be] socially constructed” (933). Thus, in our world, there are no rigid boundaries—no stable racial demarcations—which allow this distinction to be made. Thus, even in this age where ethnic boundaries have dissolved, there are still yet no strict alterations to the benefits or costs of cooperation. This means that whatever levels of trust, concord and mutual-protection may have existed prior to the dismantling of white imperial hegemony are mostly intact.

Though ethnocentrism, at least in Axelrod and Hammond’s precise formulations, reigns supreme over all other strategies, including colorblind altruism, the fact remains that cooperation writ large might just as quickly be heralded as the operative determinant of procreative/survival fitness, with 74% of interactions falling under the rubric of “cooperation” (930). This is plausible considering that cooperation can be conditional, such as by employing tit-for-tat (reciprocity) or grim-trigger (refusing to cooperate with any agent that is perceived as a non-cooperator) protocols. Similarly, cooperation with other agents need not imply self-abnegation or even resource-pooling; it is quite possible that cooperation can come in a manner mutually beneficial for all parties.

Importantly, the social structures which moderate and enforce cooperation, such as Hobbesian deference to a sovereign dictator (Hobbes), can effectively preclude any survival fitness to be incurred by reaping the benefits of altruistic others whilst defecting at every opportunity. After all, human agents are embedded in culture, and the expressions of all traits are thus immutably enjoined to such social structures.

Lastly, in defense of my assertion that the social contract need not
be eroded by the advent of multicultural societies with people of different ethnic loyalties, it is worth noting that hardwired genetic traits that express themselves in the form of colorblind altruism may yet be corollaries of other cognitive traits, ones which incur manifestations of survival fitness elsewhere. For example, it is conceivable that the cognitive propensity for diminished ethnic egoism comes in tandem with a capacity for abstract reasoning skills—such as the ability to navigate abstruse etiquette and conform to prevailing dogmas by refraining from raising the ire of reigning sovereigns as seen in Hobbes’s thought. Such talents, even if they come at the cost of occasionally losing out when donating one’s resources toward non-reciprocating egoists and defectors, can quite plausibly aid in one’s reproductive fitness. After all, when sexual reproduction is considered, much unlike the asexual reproduction in Axelrod and Hammond’s simulation, a female will likely be donating nothing other than her womb to alien agents—the quintessence of reproductive success. Put a different way, the nature of sexual selection is such that being a sucker even for foreign ethno-egoists can be rewarded with procreation. Why? Females carry more genetic material, including the material of their fathers.

Thus, given careful consideration to the fine texture of the social conditions of multicultural society, as well as the psychological considerations underpinning the social contract, there is still much room to doubt that multiculturalism poses a hard ceiling on the tightness and robustness of the social contract. The social contract need not be ethnocentric, such as it was before the fall of European imperialism, and cooperation toward unmitigated altruism remains a very real possibility, perhaps even an inevitability for human social evolution.


So, I’ve been talking to @0xa59a2d, who suggested that my thought that colorblind altruists would have a reproductive edge if altruism is preferred in females. He said that most selection happens on the male side because their genes on the sex chromosomes are more stringently selected.

I respond:

If there is one-to-one reproductive pairings–monogamy–then altruist girls getting knocked up by cheater dudes would mean that the whole population drifts towards altruism. What you were saying–Y-chromosome is the experiment, and thus rewards those cheater chromosomes–assumes that the small minority bull cheaters will “get around” and impregnate the majority of females.

If there is a) monogamy and b) substantial numbers of men and women who don’t reproduce, then we drift toward altruism. (At least, so long as the vast number of assumptions we’re operating on our true, and so long as all the loose ends were ignoring are not, et c).

IE: You were saying that ‘cullings’ and reproductive bottlenecks happen at mostly just to men–only if that were true would altruist cucks get selected out. (Remember, I am assuming that altruist females are preferred.)

Nevertheless, I’m not in favor of all the good white men in the world getting cucked out of existence. I am simply saying that it is inevitable, and that we should hasten the inevitability.

Also, I have other arguments for this horizon elsewhere in my blog article such as, for example (and this hearkens to that tweet you just linked me to) the whirlwind societal selective pressures that rewards non-egoism and so on, such as laws against being less than altruistic. People must be ever-the-more functionally altruistic as we expand the legal infrastructure.

Moreover, remember: There’s no such thing as pure ethnocentrism and pure colorblind altruism. The difference is not black and white. Just as a colorblind altruist will not last long if he’s donating his food to the sky god while he’s starving, an ethnocentrist will have to draw the bounds of “resembles myself” somewhere.

I would, however, argue that the bounds of ‘resembles me’ is differential and on a normal curve. IE: It will always define ‘resembles me’ in terms of ‘doesn’t resemble me’.

Another important thing to understand is why you should care about the suffering of the world.

And why it is only by assuming this moral high ground that we will save the white race; why it is only through this heartfelt argument for humoring HBD (IE: race realism, or at least agnosticism on questions about race and meaningful correlations) that white nationalists will be able to get what they want. And why we must gain the goodwill of the moral public to humor HBD before we can ‘save the white race’.


I was sold into cosmic slavery.

This world is so tiny, you have no idea.

My patience is infinite.


5 thoughts on “My Supposition of an Evolutionary Horizon of Colorblind Altruism

  1. you have to take cosmopolitanism into consideration here: reputation markets are on the rise and being hard coded. ‘resembles me’ will soon be boiled down to a triple digit number, with very little room for universal cooperators or racial cooperators.


    1. Sure, but where does reputation come from? It comes from who finds you useful and non-disruptive. Any technocratic ‘reputation markets’ are going to be merely descriptive tabulations of these real-world habits that people come to be known as. So, what I see you seem to be saying as interesting but not entirely relevant.

      (And that’s all we’re talking about, right? “Resembles me” boils down to “Willingness to cooperate”)

      If you’re saying that people can, through sheer calculative force of their egoic self-interest, get such high cooperative reputation scores, then you’re basically supporting my stance that cooperativeness is largely a measure of some cognitive capacity.

      Liked by 1 person

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